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Purpose ± The purpose of this study is to understand the enduring, fundamental contributions of 
accounting practices in the pursuit of decentralization by governments, with an examination of 
3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUPRIWKH0XQLFLSDOLWLHVLQWKHODWHth century in Italy. 
Design/methodology/approach ± An extensive textual analysis of the very comprehensive 
collection of primary sourFHVRIWKH*UDQG'XFK\RI7XVFDQ\GXULQJWKHGH¶0HGLFLDQG
Hapsburg-/RUUDLQH¶VUXOHLGHQWLILHGWKHUHDVRQVIRU3HWHU/HRSROG¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHFHQWUDOLze his 
government¶V authority and responsibilities. A systemic comparison of the 1765-66 and 1775-76 
financial reports of the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole disclosed the importance 
of the micro-practices of accounting and reporting for the Reform. 
Findings ± In the context of the 18th century Enlightenment, Peter Leopold legitimized his 
Reform by the introduction of a modern style of government based on the rationalisation of the 
municipal administrative system and decentralization of central authority and responsibility. The 
Reform was made feasible by the substitution of a birth right principle with an economic 
discourse which linked tax payments to property ownership. This had the unintended 
consequence of increased taxes, higher municipal expenditures, and possible inequalities 
between municipalities. 
Research limitations/implications ± The findings of the study are dependent on the resources 
which have survived and are now preserved in the official archives of Galeata and Florence. 
This work contributes to the extant literature on administrative reforms in a crucial period for 
the redefinition of sovereignty by the ruling classes, with the rise of the modern State. It extends 
historical understanding of the public sector with a focus on local government in the 18th century 
in a non-Anglo-Saxon context.  
Practical implications ± Examination of the Reform of Peter Leopold contributes to an 
enhanced understanding of present-day decentralization by governments in the context of the 
new public management (NPM). It provides to NPM advocates a broader temporal and 
contextual understanding of the impact of current decentralization reforms.  
Originality/value ± Few accounting studies have considered the micro-aspects of 
decentralization reforms at the municipal level and tried to identify their impact on the wealth of 
the population. Moreover, Peter LeopROG¶V5HIRUPLVFRQVLGHUHGRQHRIWKHPRVWLQQRYDWLYHDQG
enlightened of the 18th century, while the remainder of Europe was still overwhelmingly 
committed to the centralization of administrative apparatuses. Finally, this study relates to the 
multi-disciplinary debate about the recognition, qualification and accountization of the impact of 
decentralization of responsibility for the delivery of government services. 
Keywords ± administrative reform, accounting system, decentralization of government, 
eighteenth century, Grand Duchy of Tuscany, municipality 







The transition from the feudal State to the modern State (Anderson, 1986; Pierson, 2004; 
Poggi, 1978, 1984; Tilly, 1975) is ascribed to a period that spans the second half of the 
fifteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, when States experienced a process of 
concentration and centralization of political power and redefinition of the bases of their 
sovereignty over a specific territory (Foucault, 1982; Miller and Rose, 1992). This promoted 
a more formal coordination of their administrative divisions which, according to Poggi 
(1984), was a necessary step towards the emergence of the modern State (see also Barkey and 
Parikh, 1991; Capra, 1984). The eighteenth century is recognized as the Age of 
Enlightenment, an era of cultural and ideological change when intellectual forces in Western 
Europe, in particular philosophers such as Kant (1724-1804), Beccaria (1738-94), and Hume 
(1711-76), emphasized reason and individualism as the basis of society and government, 
rather than traditional lines of authority. Prompted by enlightened ideas (Venturi, 1970), a 
wave of administrative and judicial reforms characterized the main European monarchies, but 
especially the Hapsburg-Lorraine Empire whose extensive geographical boundaries and 
territorial acquisitions between the second half of the seventeenth century and the time of the 
reforms are indicated in Figure 1. Between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the 
Hapsburg-Lorraine Empire was the dominant presence in Europe. In Italy it embraced the 





The territories of Hapsburg-Lorraine of Austria in Italy, 
from the second half of XVII century to the second half 
of XVIII century. 
Territories of Hapsburg-Lorraine - half 
of XVII century 
 
In 1675 
After the Peace of Karlowitz (1699) 
After the Peace of Rastatt (1714) 
After the Peace of Passarowitz (1718) 
In 1720 
From 1735 to 1737 
After the split of Poland (1772) 
In 1775 
Date when some regions got their 
autonomy from the Empire 
Boundaries of Hapsburg-Lorraine 
territories in 1775 
Boundaries of the other States 
 
 




























Source: Elaboration from Homo laicus, modern history, historical maps.  Available at: 
http://www.homolaicus.com/storia/moderna/monarchie_nazionali/guerra_trentanni2.htm 




The instalment of the Hapsburg-Lorraine dynasty in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany occurred in 
1737 when the last member of the ,WDOLDQ GH¶ Medici family, Gian Gastone, died without 
legitimate heirs (La Rosa, 1997). Subsequently, a junior branch of the Hapsburg-Lorraine 
dynasty ruled the Grand Duchy of Tuscany from 1737 to 1858, a few years before Italian 
unification. This long domination is divided into two periods (Bellatalla, 1984). During the 
first period, from 1737 to the Seven Years War in 1763, there were some attempts at financial 
and administrative reorganization of the Grand Duchy. This first period of domination, when 
the Grand Duchy was recognized merely as part of the jurisdiction of the Hapsburg-Lorraine 
Empire, includes the efforts of Maria Theresa (Empress and mother of Peter Leopold) to 
influence the financial and administrative reorganization of Tuscany by greater centralisation 
of authority and responsibilities (Baldacci 2000; Bellatalla, 1984; La Rosa 1997; Peham, 
1990). In the second period of domination (1763-1858), when the Grand Duchy became a 
regency which was assigned to Peter Leopold in 1765, Tuscany experienced the most 
innovative phase of the Hapsburg-Lorraine¶V rule, during which the emphasis was on 
decentralizing State responsibilities to municipalities. Thus, the first ten years of Peter 
/HRSROG¶VUHJHQF\-1774) are identified by historians as the period for ³the building of 
a new State´ (Capra, 1984; Valsecchi, 1931-34). It was a time when there was a very 
different State from that ZKLFK KDG H[LVWHG GXULQJ WKH GH¶ 0HGLFL HUD ³$ 6WDWH RI FLWLHV
grown out of a process of aggregation and constituting therefore a mosaic of autonomous 
units, held together by a thick web oIELODWHUDOFRPSDFWV´0DQQRUL 
 
Between 1765 and 13HWHU/HRSROG¶VJRYHUQPHQWILQDOL]HG the general reorganization of 
peripheral territories, including those of the Romagna-Tuscany Province, an area of strategic 
importance with its location at the boundaries of the Grand Duchy with the Papal State 
(Vasina, 1981). The town fortress of Terra del Sole, one of the most important military 
achievements of the GH¶ Medici family (Donatini, 1998; Zaghini, 1981), was merged with 
Castrocaro, thereby bringing to the new municipality also the Parishes of Montecchio, 
Converselle, Salatara, Castello and Zola. This new municipality was brought back into the 
administrative district of Florence, where the reigning dynasty was embarking on a détente 
with the local élites (Contini, 2002). Wandruszka (1968: 129) GHVFULEHG3HWHU/HRSROG¶VPDLQ
challenge in Tuscany as:  
 
On one hand, there was a little region with ancient traditions [Tuscany], far from 
WKH(XURSHDQ µKLJK¶SROLFLHV OLNH DOPRVWDOO WKHRWKHUSDUWVRf Italy) and on the 
other hand, there was the Austro-Hungarian Empire that had many problematic 
issues to solve, but it also had an intellectual political class. That class was open 
to the Enlightenment ideas and to the Physiocrat theories, therefore, the vital 
willingness and desire of reform finalization which that class searched for was 
found in the young Peter Leopold. 
 
The period from 1774-75 to 1790 is recognised as important for the reforms of Peter Leopold 
(hereafter the Reform) that affected administrative, judicial and economic aspects of life in 
the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (Wandruszka, 1968). The Reform (see Maran et al., 2013) is 
considered to be RQHRI3HWHU/HRSROG¶VILUVWDQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWDVVDXOWVDJDLQVWWKH legacy 
of the GH¶0HGLFLSROLFLHV (Fasano Guarini, 1997; Mannori, 1994). Whereas other European 
monarchies gave a priority to the centralization of political and administrative apparatuses 
consistent with the development of a modern State (Poggi, 1978), Peter Leopold instead 
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chose a decentralist approach that empowered government at the municipal level rather than 
the central government. The main events in the period or Reform are summarised in Figure 2. 
 




Peter LHRSROG¶Voverall style of governing privileged more practical and technical solutions, 
based on detailed analyses of the local population, rather than theoretical ideas. This was 
demonstrated by the three volumes of Reports of the Government of Tuscany (Silvestrini, 
ZKLFKKHOHIWIRUKLVVXFFHVVRU¶VEHQHILWZKHQKHPRYHGin 1790 to Vienna to take the 
crown of the Hapsburg-Lorraine Empire. 7KHSHFXOLDUDVSHFWRI3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUPZDV
his early interest in the local population, while the remainder of Europe was still 
overwhelmingly committed to the centralization of administrative apparatuses. Indeed, in the 
remainder of the Hapsburg-Lorraine Empire under Maria Theresa, and then Joseph II (first 
son of Maria Theresa to inherit the Crown), centralization remained the preferred reformist 
choice (Capra, 2005; Sargiacomo, 2009). Oestreich (1982) and Rose (1991) have shown how 
VWXGLHVRIWKH(XURSHDQ³VFLHQFHRISROLFH´LQWKHVHYHQWHHQWKDQGHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXULHVKDYH
primarily emphasized centralization in the exercise of surveillance and discipline (Rose, 
1991: 676). More specifically, Miller (1990: 318) emphasized the strengthening of the centre 
RI JRYHUQPHQW GXULQJ &ROEHUW¶V SHULRG LQ )UDQFH 7KH FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ RI SXEOLF VHFWRU
accounting practices has also been documented in France before and after the French 
revolution (Nitikin, 2001) and a study by Sanchez-Matamoros and Gutierrez Hidalgo (2012) 
analysed the implications of coinage policies in Spain as part of the process of the 
centralization of government, a very similar approach to the central management of tsarist 
finances in Russia (Platonova 2009). Dunleavy and Hood (1994), Pollitt (2005), McLaughlin 
and Osborne (2005), Guthrie et al. (1999), Gruening (2001) and Hyndman and Liguori (2016) 
show how understanding the enduring aims and approaches adopted across different 
institutions and locations in the pursuit of decentralisation is enhanced by historical analyses 
of prominent attempts to move responsibility, and where necessary authority, for the delivery 




This study engages with a call to expand historical understandings of the public sector with a 
focus on local government, that is the municipality, in the eighteenth century and in a non-
Anglo-Saxon context (see the call from Anderson, 2002; Bisman, 2012; Carmona, 2004; 
Platonova, 2009; Sargiacomo and Gomez, 2011; Wanna, 2005; William and Wines, 2006). 
Despite a high level of attention which public sector reforms have attracted (Black et al., 
2001; Cobbin and Burrows, 2010; Funnell, 2008; Nitikin, 2001; Platonova, 2009) few 
accounting studies have considered the micro-aspects of decentralization reforms at the 
municipal level and tried to identify their financial impact. The micro-aspects of 
decentralisation move beyond values and principles which drive the reforms to the 
operationalization of the reforms, such as the amount saved at the local/central level with the 
shift of responsibility in service delivery and tax collection from the central to the local 
government.  
 
Examination of 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V innovative Reform gives the opportunity to provide 
historical context to the ongoing debate today around the decentralization processes in a 
³PRGHUQ´ 6WDWH E\ XVLQJ KLVWRULFDO GDWD WR examine a completed decentralisation project. 
Support for the decentralization of public services by the adoption of private sector models of 
management continues to dominate the cross-disciplinary debate around the role of the State 
(Blumfield and Coombs, 1992; Hutchcroft, 2001; Ho, 2004; Lowrie, 1922; Miller and 
Napier, 1993; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007). Over the past three decades the public 
sector of OECD countries and others has been transformed according to the imperatives and 
values of the New Public Management (NPM) with dramatic shifts in the roles of 
governments and the means with which they fulfil their mandates (Naschold, 1995: 1). These 
changes introduced under the NPM umbrella of reforms have sought to correct perceived 
pathologies associated with the public sector, including the size of government, the 
inefficiency of government agencies and programmes (Alonso et al., 2015; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004; Van de Walle and Hammerschmid, 2011) and related deficiencies in the 
accountability of public sector managers for their performance (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993; 
Pollitt and Dan, 2011). NPM has been influenced by an eclectic range of ideas from many 
different disciplines, including public-choice theory and transaction-cost economics 
(Gruening, 2001). The emphasis has been on the themes of responsibility and accountability 
relationships, the dividing of state functions into controllable tasks, the adoption of business-
like management styles and the decentralization of decision making (Groot and Budding, 
2008). Pollitt (2007) has characterised NPM as a two-level phenomenon consisting of, on the 
political level, a general motivation to improve the public sector and, on the administrative 
level, a set of specific concepts, policies and practices to bring about reform of the public 
sector.   
 
There is considerable debate around the benefits of decentralization, most importantly 
expected revenue mobilisation of local sources, improved allocative efficiency and a decrease 
in tax pressure. These are set against possible disadvantages, the most obvious of which 
might be increased expenditure and reduced service quality. There is also disagreement about 
the way to measure public sector performance where decentralization occurs in developed 
countries (Ackroyd, 1995; Haider, 1971; Kaufman, 1969) and developing countries (Conyers, 
2007; Andrews and Shah, 2003). Zafra-Gómez et al. (2012) note that the evaluation of the 
impacts, or implications, of decentralization reforms requires a close examination of the 
financial reporting at the local (municipal) level both before and after reform. Sargiacomo 
(2006) reminds us that the role of accounting is to disclose the way in which money is raised 
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and spent, thus specifying and quantifying the major homogeneous groups of expenses at the 
local level, the adopted social priorities and concerns at the time. Although accounting 
studies have dealt with the use of accounting as a technology of government (Alvarez et al., 
2002; Carmona and Gomez. 2002; Carmona et al., 1998, 2002; Donoso, 2002; Gutiérrez and 
Romero, 2007 and 2010; Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 2000; Sargiacomo, 2008), few have 
extended this to local levels of government (for a comprehensive review see Sargiacomo and 
Gomes, 2011). ([DPLQDWLRQRI3HWHU/HRSROG¶VUHIRUPSURvides the means to recognize the 
enduring, non-temporally dependent nature of the aims of public sector reforms which seek to 
implement political priorities that depend upon the more effective and efficient delivery of 
services at the local level. Indeed, the origin and typology of modern States in Western 
monarchies can be better contextualized through an accounting analysis at the local level 
where ³arts of government´ and economic calculation are not easily separable (Bonney, 
1995, 1999; Foucault, 1982; Hirschman, 1984; Miller, 1990; Miller and Napier, 1993). 
 
The analysis is presented in six sections. Section 2 provides details of the way in which the 
study was conducted and the themes which directed the research. Section 3 discusses the new 
logic of PetHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUP and Section 4 shows the impact on the accounting practices 
RI3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUP. Section 5 identifies the financial impact of the Reform at a local 
level with reference to the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole. Section 6 provides 
some final remarks, stressing the contribution of the present work to the extant literature. 
 
2. Methodological aspects 
:KHUHDVWKHKLVWRULFDOHPHUJHQFHRIWKH³PRGHUQ´6WDWHRFFXUUHGGXULQJWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW
period (Sargiacomo, 2006), the concept RI ³GHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ´ is mostly associated with the 
wave of NPM reforms and the related re-conceptualisation of relationships between central 
(higher) and local (lower) levels of government in the delivery of public services, to improve 
the effectiveness of policies and the efficiency and quality of services. Accordingly, 
³PRGHUQLW\´UHODWHVWRWKHVHSDUDWLRQRISRZHUVEHWZHHQWKHOHJLVODWXUHWKHH[HFXWLYHDQGWKH
judiciary when power no longer resides in one individual and an administrative apparatus to 
sHUYH WKH H[HFXWLYH SRZHU 0RVW RI WKH ³PRGHUQ´ 6WDWHV RI WKH SHULRG XQGHU DQDO\VLV, in 
particular the Hapsburg-Lorraine and Russian empires, the French, Spanish and British 
monarchies, ZHUH QRW ³GHFHQWUDOLVHG´ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK JRYHUQPHQW LV
conceptualised by NPM. The delivery of public services was firmly controlled and managed 
by the central level of government with no devolution of autonomy and responsibilities to the 
local levels. Consequently, following Sargiacomo (2006), this study extends our 
understanding of the decentralization rationale and its impact to the historical period when 
the ³modern´ State emerged with a detailed examination of the impact on 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V
Reform of the Municipalities in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in the eighteenth century when 
he held the regency of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany from 1765 to 1790. His Reform was 
amongst the first major reforms which reflected the transformation of government from the 
feudal State, embedding the decentralisation of responsibilities to the local level of 
government.  
 
The present study identifies WKH UDWLRQDOH LPSOLFDWLRQV DQG LPSDFWV RI 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V
Reform at the local level (see Beccattini, 2012; Capra, 2005) through an accounting and 
accountability perspective, with specific reference to the Municipality of Castrocaro and 
Terra del Sole. Castrocaro and Terra del Sole maintained a strategic position in the Grand-
Duchy of Tuscany under two subsequent rulers, the GH¶ Medici family and the Hapsburg-
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Lorraine dynasty. This has left some of the richest and most complete archives covering civil 
and judicial administration (Dal Lauro, 1989; Puccetti Caruso, 2007; Zaghini, 1981; Fasano 
Guarini, 1968, 1973). Access to this very comprehensive collection of primary sources, pre- 
and post-reform, provides the ability to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 
decentralization processes within a well-defined historical period. It also helps in 
understanding the intended and unintended consequences of political and administrative 
decentralization. Moreover, studies of the Reform have been dominated by economic-
juridical scholars who have focussed on only some of its aspects, such as the wealth 
conditions of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (see Dal Pane, 1965; Diaz, 1966; Mirri, 1972; 
Turi, 1969; Valsecchi, 1931-34; Venturi, 1958, 1969, 1970, 1987) or the figure of Peter 
Leopold and his government (see Benedikt, 1964; Wandruszka, 1968), with very limited 
references to the accounting impact.  
 
When evaluating decentralization reforms, Alfonso et al. (2015) emphasize the importance of 
considering both the political and administrative levels involved. The political level is 
concerned with the discourses motivating reform which set the motives of the administrative 
decentralization (Pollitt, 2007). In relationship to allocative and distributive efficiency, the 
political discourse refers to the transfer of electoral power and political authority (autonomy) 
from the central government to lower levels (Falleti, 2005), whereas the administrative level 
involves the means used in the actual transfer of autonomy for public policy management, 
personnel and control of public finances (Rondinelli et al., 1989). Decentralization reforms, 
VXFKDV3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUPLQKDYHDV\PEROLFPHDQLQJWKDWLVJHQHUDOO\DLmed at 
furthering the legitimacy of the new political leadership (Lægreid and Olsen, 1984). In the 
present study, Peter Leopold not only introduced values, principles and structures that were 
obviously different from the former mode of governing, they gave a strong signal that the 
new ruling style in the management of the Tuscany region was embedded in significant 
decentralisation. Decentralization reforms are often presented with the rhetoric of norms and 
values (Downs and Larkey, 1986; March and Olsen, 1983; Power, 1997) that portray a new 
beginning along promising new paths of substantial improvements, as elucidated by the 
accounting practices (Sargiacomo, 2006). From the analysis of the expenses 1670-1682 of the 
Commune of Penne, Sargiacomo (2006, p. 492) LGHQWLILHGWKDW³one of the major concerns of 
the Commune was related to the obligation of providing financial support to the Spanish 
government, due to the need of military surveillance in the territories belonging to the Vice-
Kingdom of Naples´. AnotheU³social priority of the time was represented by the funding of 
Church activities, which involved the Commune in paying salaries for religious personnel 
working in certain churches, and alms to religious institutions, as well as paying for yearly 
religious events, such as the feast held for S. 0DVVLPRWKHWRZQ3DWURQ6DLQW´Sargiacomo, 
2006, p. 492). 
 
 
In both theory and practice, decentralization of responsibilities for service provision has been 
recognized as one of the main components of the prescriptions for reform associated with 
NPM (Pollitt, 2007), although it predates the NPM movement. The transfer of responsibility 
and accountability for the delivery of programmes and related services from the centre of 
government to local authorities with the implementation of NPM reforms, emphasize Pallott 
(2001) and Smith (2004), has been recognized especially as a complex, multidimensional 
process (Smoke, 2003) with respect to the socio-political and legal setting (Chan and 
Rosenbloom, 2010) and levels of fiscal/financial autonomy (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010; 
Yilmaz et al., 2010). Although a number of recent studies have examined the NPM reforms, 
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there have been relatively few systematic attempts to evaluate the effects of decentralization. 
Goodwin et al. (2004) discuss the role of coordination and trust in the development of 
network governance models in the delivery of public services while Martin and Boaz (2000) 
emphasize the difficulty of designing user-IRFXVVHG VHUYLFHV LQ ³FLWL]HQ-FHQWUHG´ IRUPV RI
government.  0RRUHDQG.HHQSUHVHQWDVWXG\RQ³MRLQHG-XS´IRUPVRIJRYHUQPHQWRI
public services highlighting how the efficiency and quality of services as advocated by NPM 
reforms were translated into higher expenditure and made more difficult the representation of 
the variety of service configurations involved.  
 
Other studies, such as those of Ferlie et al. (1996), Kettl (2000) and Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2004), have been more explicit in evaluating the effects of decentralisation. Kettl (2000) 
defines devolution as the conferral of authority and responsibility for public service delivery 
from the higher level of government to lower levels, which in turn involved local for-profit 
and not-for profit organisations. Kettl (2000) implies that despite the survival of traditional 
forms of governance, that is bureaucracies, with a less invasive role of the central government 
decentralisation imposes the emergence of horizontal organisational networks. 
Decentralisation is mostly justified by expected savings (economies) in public expenditure, 
improving the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of policies (good government) and 
services, and enhancing accountabilities at the lower levels of government. Alonso et al. 
(2015) consider attempts to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation to 
be limited in terms of the level of analysis, which has been mainly at the macro level and, of 
particular relevance for this study, the time periods examined. Thus, they call for a more 
extensive evaluation of the impacts of decentralization focussing on political and 
administrative decentralization in different contexts at different times to broaden and enrich 
access to experience which might inform more contemporary reforms of the NPM.  
 
In a manner similar to Fairclough (2004), Pollitt (2001), Vaara et al. (2010) and Hyndman et 
al. (2014), who analysed the discursive dynamics that accompanied the legislative process of 
NPM reforms WR HYDOXDWH WKH LPSDFW DQG VXFFHVV RI 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V UHIRUPV, a detailed 
textual analysis was conducted RI3HWHU/HRSROG¶V*HQHUDO5HJXODWLRQKHUHDIWHU*5
and the Particular Regulation (hereafter PR) of the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del 
Sole (1775). This has provided the means to establish the importance 3HWHU/HRSROG¶V Reform 
at the municipal level of practices and their resonance with the themes which underlie recent 
NPM reforms. In this analysis, a specific focus has been given to the political rationalities of 
Peter Leopold (see Sargiacomo, 2008), which  are shown to be similar to NPM-like principles 
of decentralisation, and how they were shaped into the GR (1774) and PR (1775) of 
Castrocaro and Terra del Sole. The way in which the Reform was enacted in the Municipality 
of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole is established with a comparative accounting analysis of the 
financial reports of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole before (1765-66) and after (1775-76) the 
Reform (see also Figure 2). The first year RI3HWHU/HRSROG¶V UHJHQF\ 1765-66, which was 
nearly a decade before any major reforms, has provided a point of reference to show the 
extent of the impact of his 1774-75 Reform. The second set of dates, 1775-76, refers to the 
first year after the enactment of the GR and the adoption of the PR in Castrocaro and Terra 
del Sole, when the Reform should have shown its full effects. The GR, which were applicable 
to all municipalities in the Grand Duchy, clearly showed the general changes and the new 
philosophy of the Reform conceived by Peter Leopold. The PR concerned only the 
MunicipalLW\RI&DVWURFDURDQG7HUUDGHO6ROHHPSKDVL]LQJ3HWHU/HRSROG¶VSUDFWLFDOLQWHUHVW
in the local population (Silvestrini, 1969). The unit of analysis for both the GR and the PR of 




When evaluating public sector reform the political economy literature emphasizes the 
following parameters: increase in real per capita gross domestic product, decrease of average 
unemployment rates, labour productivity growth, increase of per-capita real income of low-
income households (Dalziel and Saunders, 2010). Taxation literature, meanwhile, focuses on 
distributional effects of taxation (Aaron and Gale, 2010). Unlike these studies, the current 
accounting literature does not address specific variables but shifts the assessment of public 
decentralization reforms to NPM standards of ³good practices´ (or ³good government´) 
developed through a process of ³fact´ building, which involves the undertaking of local 
experiments by practitioners, the production of inscriptions in reports and their subsequent 
validation by other practitioners (Gendron et al., 2007). Other NPM accounting literature 
suggests consideration of the implementation of budgets, the adoption of financial standards 
(Berlrand and Chiapello, 2009; Covaleski et al., 2013; Ezzamel et al., 2012; Guerreiro et al., 
2012) and formal allocation of responsibilities (Humphrey and Miller, 2012) to evaluate 
specific aspects of decentralisation reforms such as the accomplishment of public 
accountability.  
 
As a minimum, and most obviously, decentralisation should result in a reduction of the public 
deficit (Bird, 1993; Bird and Wallich, 1993). Economic growth should also be clearly 
promoted with a higher revenue mobilization from local sources, including revenues coming 
from duties on commercial and productive activities at the local level (Bhal and Linn, 1992; 
Gramlich, 1993; Oates, 1993). A further feature of decentralisation is the improved 
³allocative efficiency´, defined as the best match between the demand for services and their 
supply (Andrews and Entwistle, 2013). The opportunity of local administrations to better 
interpret and address community needs should ensure effectiveness in the provision of public 
services but also efficiency in terms of lower expenses of service provision than at the central 
level, lower central offices expenses given their lower involvement in the service delivery 
and less tax pressure given the improved efficiency. According to Andrews and Entwistle 
(2013), ³allocative efficiency´ should be read together with ³GLVWULEXWLYH HIILFLHQF\´ or 
improved decision-making on expenditures and the delivery of public services. Local 
governments should have the ability to identify the best pattern of service delivery amongst 
different groups of citizens (Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956). Therefore, a common ground of the 
arguments advanced by Andrews and Entwistle (2013 RQ ³DOORFDWLYH DQG GLVWULEXWLYH´
efficiency in decentralisation reforms (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) is shaped around the 
actual political participation of the local population, who seek greater control of their 
circumstances (Andrews and De Vries, 2007; Conyers, 2007; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997) 
and trigger transference of authority to the local area (De Vries, 2000; Manor, 1999). Both 
these efficiencies are summarized by NPM in the ³subsidiary principle´, now much discussed 
in the current European Union, which reinforces the idea that the central level of government 
should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks that cannot be performed 
effectively at a local level (Thomas, 1996, p. 43). 
 
To be effective, the ³subsidiary´ principle should be coupled with ³autonomy´ of the local 
level of government (Halligan, 2006, p. 194). Christensen and Lægreid (2006) argue that 
autonomy may have variations. Thus, they distinguish policy or managerial autonomy from 
structural, financial or legal autonomy (Christensen and Lægreid, 2001; Verhost et al., 2004). 
7KH\DOVRVWUHVVWKDW³DXWRQRP\´ may apply in various degrees, depending on the devolution 
and delegation from the central level of government. Christensen and Lægreid (2004) state 
that any effort to increase local autonomy is accompanied by instances of conflict between 
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³FRQWURO DQG DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ that creates tension ZLWK ³DXWRQRP\´ at the local level. This 
tension can be solved when both political and administrative authority are delegated to the 
locality (Olsen, 2009). Llewellyn (1998) emphasizes the centrality of the concept of ³public 
service´ in terms of allocated responsibility in decentralization processes (Hart, 1951; Shaver, 
1975): ³having assigned tasks´ and ³responsiveness to the others´ (Spann, 1978). 
Accordingly, the textual analysis of the Reform is focussed on identifying how Peter 
Leopold¶V 5HIRUP ZDV shaped by principles of decentralisation which have characterised 
NPM: good government (or good practices), subsidiary, public service, autonomy of the 
municipality and control. The analysis of financial reports at the municipal level from before 
and after the Reform used for this study focused on variation in the level of revenues and 
expenditure at the municipal level, variation of tax amounts and repartition of the expenses 
between the municipal and central level. The primary sources used for this purpose were 
originally written or typed in Italian for the Tuscany region (and translated in English by the 
authors). They are stored in the Historical Archives of Florence and Galeata in Italy, with the 
latter Archives containing a specific and parallel collection of regulations for the whole 
Grand Duchy of Tuscany, annotated by a lawyer. 
 
3. 3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUP7KH³NHZ´Logic?  
The new Regulations for the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole introduced by 
Peter Leopold¶V 5HIRUP were substitutes for the entire former legislation based on the de 
0HGLFL¶V6WDWXWHRIEHFRPLQJWKHRQO\VRXUFHVRIODZIRUWKHSRSXODWLRQRIWKH*UDQG
Duchy. Peter Leopold noted that the GH¶ Medici administration was not characterised by the 
need for ordered and clear government (Anzilotti, 1910b). The Reform of Peter Leopold was 
conceived to reorganize the Grand Duchy and to modify the nature of the relationships 
between the central organs and the periphery (Anzilotti, 1910a, 1910b). The GR, a substantial 
document, contains an Introduction, 101 articles or sections, and a final table with the details 
of the new geographical and administrative organization of the municipalities of the Grand 
Duchy. The PR of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole is much smaller, containing an Introduction 
and 18 articles. The application of the PR of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole meant that the 
new territorial asset required a new calculation of the value of real estate and durables and the 
creation of a new register of lands. Thus, the first article of the PR stressed that ³the 
territories under the jurisdiction of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole must be defined through the 
real estate of their respective populations´. Peter Leopold defined his new logic as the 
introduction of ³good government´ principles and objectives (see section 2 and 3 of 
Appendix 1). In the first line of the GR Introduction the aim of the reform is specified as: ³In 
the name of both good order and justice, it is necessary that the economic aspects are 
managed and administrated by those who have direct and main interests on them´, which 
introduces the ³subsidiary principle´ (see section 1 of Appendix 1). According to the logic of 
NPM, this principle implies the recognition that the municipal entity can exercise delegated 
tasks better than the higher entity (central government), given the better knowledge that the 
municipality will have of local needs. Therefore, the higher entity should not intervene, but 
simply support the activity of the municipality. This should increase the efficiency of the 
administrative apparatuses and avoid an excessive and bureaucratic centralism.  
 
The link emphasized between the municipal administration and an economic rationale 
VXSSRUWVQRWRQO\D IRFXVRQ WKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VZHDOWK )RXFDXOWZKLFKFKDUDFWHrizes 
the emergence of a ³modern´ State, but also the need to normalize and instrumentalize people 
through a form of economic accountability (Rose, 1991). Even though Oestreich (1982) and 
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Rose (1991) claimed a general push towards centralization for the European monarchies in 
the eighteenth century, the choices made by Peter Leopold for the Grand Duchy of Tuscany 
demonstrates the possibility of a choice of forms of decentralization of government, which is 
similar to current NPM logic, the implementation of which carefully distributes 
responsibilities and tasks at the municipal level. Figure 3 depicts the organization of the 
Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole, as interpreted from both the GR and PR (see 
Appendix 1 with specific reference to sections 1, 4, 6 and 8). 
 
 
Figure 3 ± Administrative organization of the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del 


















A new Magistratura and General Council were created which were in charge of the 
Municipality¶V wealth, with some autonomy from the central level. The autonomy was also 
linked to the consideration that the most efficient level at which to manage the economic 
aspects was that closest to the local population, which is very similar to the NPM 
decentralisation claim of subsidiary (see Zafra-Gómez et al., 2013). The GR affirmed that 
µWe mean that every member of Magistratura has to run and manage all business interests of 
their municipality¶ (GR, article 24) and WKDW µThe local public offices have to manage their 
municipality trying to improve its economic interests¶ (GR, article 27, see section 4 of 
Appendix 1). This recognizes the benefits which are now accepted as most important from 
decentralization (De Vries, 2000; Manor, 1999) by enhancing responsibility and autonomy 




The µgood government¶ SULQFLSOHV RI 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V 5HIRUP LQYROYHG ERWK D QHZ
mechanism of eligibility to be a member of the municipal public offices (section 2 of 
Appendix 1) and new taxation criteria (section 3 of Appendix 1). A person was eligible to be 
elected through the electoral mechanism of the Borsa as one of the new administrative 
figures, such as those included by the Magistratura, on the basis of the property that they 
owned and its value, without any regard to their place of residence (article 11 PR), family 
origins or titles. The Decimino (or Book of Estimates) was the database for the exercise of the 
Borsa and levying taxes (see Appendix 1, section 2). A further innovation, promoted through 
the GR and PR, was a new taxation system based on a two-step process of tax collection 
which relied upon D µ5HGHPSWLRQ WD[¶ 7KH µRedemption tax¶, as detailed in Appendix 1 
section 3, was imposed by the central level on the municipalities and calculated as a fixed 
amount for each municipality (PR). The municipality could choose how to levy the tax over 
three main categories of owners: land or building owners, handicraftsmen and peasants. A 
limit was set for handicraftsmen and peasants, regardless of the municipality expenses (article 
42, GR). The difference between the amount that the municipality had to pay to the central 
government and the total amount of taxes levied on handicraftsmen and peasants had to be 
paid by land or buildings owners (article 42, GR). This confirms that the Reform 
decentralised the collection of taxes and it allowed some autonomy to the local levels on 
decisions regarding how to distribute the taxation among the population for efficiency and 
equity purposes. However, it did not mean that the power of levying taxes was also 
transferred to the local level. Peter Leopold still expected that every municipality transferred 
the taxes collected to the central level. The new taxation system was to guarantee income for 
Peter Leopold at the central level. 
 
Peter Leopold sought to use this taxation system to reinforce the rationality and efficiency of 
his Reform (see PruG¶KRPH, 1995; Spina, 2014). Thus, article 45 of the GR stressed how the 
release of control by the central level over municipal government would result in an overall 
decrease in taxation (see section 3 of Appendix 1). Therefore, the link between administrative 
participation and ownership was explained through the taxation system, the certainty of 
which, once again, was guaranteed through the calculation based on Decimino records 
(Maran et al., 2013). The ordinary taxation (³Redemption tax´) which represented the most 
important income at the central level (Contini and Martelli, 2007) was used to cover central 
government expenses and the municipal requests regarding roads maintenance, postal service 
and wages of the government departments.  
 
In his Reform, Peter Leopold recognised the principle of public service by the municipal 
offices, giving specific attention to the behaviour of the officers and how they exerted their 
responsibilities. Appendix 1, section 4 shows how the activities of the local administrators 
were derived from a definition of rules, responsibilities and obligations.  Peter Leopold 
emphasized µpublic conduct¶ in the GR articles concerning the equality and impartiality of 
public officers (articles 24 and 27, GR). With regard to impartiality, Peter Leopold stated that 
PXQLFLSDO RIILFHUV ZHUH WR EH SDLG RQO\ WKH µLQVWLWXWLRQDO¶ ZDJH DQG QRWKLQJ PRUH 7R
guarantee the competence of the public officers, article 50 of the GR stressed the need to 
choose Deputati (organs of control of the Magistratura) among those skilled persons who 
were eligible through the mechanism of the Borsa. Furthermore, some forms of public 
control were identifiable in articles 53 and 59 of the GR, such as joint accountability of the 
Deputati and accountability of the Cancelliere towards the Deputati. The NPM nature of 
3HWHU /HRSROG¶V LGHDV UHJDUGLQJ WKH EHQHILWV RI GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ VHH +DUW  6KDYHU
1975) was tied to recognition of a political and economic interest of the elected bodies to 
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manage well the municipality (subsidiary principle, see Appendix 1). The level of 
specialization required by the Reform (as shown in Appendix 1 section 4) highlighted two 
essential aspects of responsibility typical of the creation of professional bureaucracies (see 
Llewellyn, 1998), namely ³assignment of tasks´ (see Spann, 1978) and ³responsiveness to 
the others´, which are explicitly considered in the Reform principles.  
 
The autonomy principle was included in many articles of the GR (see Appendix 1, sections 5, 
6 and 7), which outlined three different types of autonomy: municipal autonomy, which 
related to the activities delegated to the Magistratura (articles 24, 27 and 45); expenditure 
autonomy, which provided municipal officers with a degree of freedom in the use of public 
funding (articles 27, 28, 29, 44), and income autonomy, which allowed some discretion to 
municipal officers to fix the taxation amount and managing the revenues from the estates 
(articles 27, 32, 35). The activities specifically delegated to the Magistratura were defined in 
a broad sense as µthe management of everything that concerned the municipal interest¶ 
(articles 27 and 45). The GR emphasized how Peter Leopold would set apart responsibility 
for expenditure from control of income (tax). Article 27 of the GR states that the central level 
leaves to the Magistratura of the municipality the µdiscretion to reform or decrease excessive 
expenditures when it seems necessary¶. In addition, article 28 of the GR highlights that µthe 
municipality is free from any obligation to ask for the central approval on payments of both 
WKH RIILFHUV¶ ZDJHV DQG WKH H[SHQGLWXUHV WKH\ LQFXU ZKLOH WKH\ DUH DFWLQJ IRU WKH SXEOLF
VHUYLFH >«@ )RU WKLV UHDVRQ WKHLU H[SHQGLWXUHV KDYH WR EH SDLG GLUHFWO\ WKURXJK WKH
Camarlingo of the municipality¶ (see section 6 of Appendix 1). The central level devolved a 
set of activities to the municipality and it linked financial autonomy to these activities. Article 
32 of the GR notes that the Giusdicente (of the Magistratura) ³has the possibility to cut off 
the municipal expenditure when he thinks that it is too burdensome or not useful for the 
municipality´. In this case, Peter Leopold seemed to emphasize the autonomy of the 
municipal level for expenditure. However, a different approach was applied to income where 
a more constrained degree of autonomy was shown (see section 7 of Appendix 1). This 
diversified approach is clarified in article 32 of the GR, which establishes that the 
municipality ³cannot bind neither sell its estate directly. It cannot compromise the amount of 
rents, receivables or other credits in order to increase the municipal public funding, without 
the explicit agreement of the central level´. Article 35 of the GR, further imposed the 
reinvestment of the amount from sales of municipal or religious assets into the banks of 
Florence.  
 
The Regulations emphasized new forms of controls and a willingness to establish 
accountability relationships among the municipal actors. While Peter Leopold emphasized 
the decrease of central control, such as in article 45 which required that µthe number of the 
Municipal accounting books checked by the accounting auditors of Florence will decrease¶, 
three different control levels were established at the municipal level, as shown in section 8 of 
Appendix 1.  Magistratura was the first level of management and control while Deputati 
were the second level, and the third one encompassed the tax auditors (article 54, GR). The 
latter level of control was meant to guarantee the correctness of the tax calculation and 
distribution of tax revenue. Thus, tax auditors had to control the Deputati¶V DFWLRQV
concerning taxation and the Deputati had to send written reports of their activity to the 
Magistratura (art. 52, GR). Peter Leopold further suggested a general (social) control over 
the public officers, in addition to any other formal control. Article 60 noted that ³Any owner 
or tax payer is always allowed to see the books of income and expenditure of his municipality 
Cancellerie without paying ...´. The financial reports of 1765-66 and 1775-76 which capture 
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PXQLFLSDO DFFRXQWV EHIRUH DQG DIWHU 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V Reform identify the intent of the 
Reform. Although the accounts were very similar in the simple bookkeeping method used to 
ensure clarity and transparency, the 1775-76 accounts clearly show the nature of Peter 
/HRSROG¶V5eform. 
 
4. The Accounting Dimension of 3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUP  
The main sections of the financial reports in 1765-66 and 1775-76 remained similar, thereby 
indicating that there were pre-defined rules or accounting practices. Both the municipal 
financial reports show a clear partition between ³Income´ and ³Expenditure´. Income from 
regular activities was collected under ³Standard Income´. This included income from the 
mill, the warehouse and the cellar that formed a type of patrimony of the Municipality. 
Another source of income for Castrocaro and Terra del Sole, called ³Income from 
Outsourcing´ in 1765-66 and in 1775-76 referred to as µ,QFRPH LQFOXGHG LQ WKH *HQHUDO
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ZDVUHODWHGWRFXVWRPGXWLHVRQEUHDGZLQH, oil and commercial activities of 
the Municipality such as taverns, mills, slaughterhouses and bakeries. ³Custom duties on 
estimates´ referred to a duty on the estimated rent of land-RZQHUV¶ SURSHUWLHV and ³rent´ 
referred to buildings. However, the possibility of linking the payment of specific taxes to 
properties emerged clearly only in 1775-76 through the Decimino Book, which represented 
the first rational effort to determine the local population¶V wealth through estimates of their 
properties as a possible basis for both the taxation and the local electoral system. In 1775-76, 
the ³interests from the census [1]´, a duty to be paid, referred to buildings and land. The 
LQWURGXFWLRQ RI WKH µSURSHUW\¶ HOHPHQW ZLWKLQ WKH ILQDQFLDO UHSRUW RI WKH 0XQLFLSDOLW\
represented a significant change, giving visibility to the social class of owners and thereby to 
their new political role. The new financial report of the Municipality was meant to increase 
the commitment of the Municipality towards the community it administered. The reference 
here is to the principle of subsidiary that emerged from the textual analysis of the Reform 
(see Appendix 1), in particular the expected commitment of the Municipality to look after the 
interests of its own population, from an economic, political, administrative and social point of 
view with the provision of public services, support for the poor families and similar practices.  
 
The provision of a financial report to a municipality and not to the central level of 
government, and the inclusion in the report of data regarding the above-mentioned support, 
recognises a broader consideration of the community of reference. Concern for the members 
of the community most in need was evidenced in the information related to ³Economic 
privileges for families with [at least] twelve children´, the management of which was 
completely devolved to the Municipality after the Reform in 1775. This is shown when the 
the ³Economic privileges for families with [at least] twelve children´ are recorded on both 
WKH³,QFRPH´VLGHwhich means the Municipality was funded by the central government to 
KHOSWKRVHLQQHHGDQGWKH³([SHQGLWXUH´VLGHof the financial report, which indicated how 
the Municipality decided to distribute the income received. In both the financial reports of 
1765-66 and 1775-76 WKH ³([FHSWLRQDO LQFRPH´ FRQFHUQHG WKH UHLPEXUVHPHQW to the 
Municipality coming from the central administration for roads maintenance expenses. 
                                                          
[1@³&HQVXV´, which referred to the wealth of the municipality in the financial reports of the municipalities under 
3HWHU/HRSROG¶VUXOHUHFRUGVWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\ZKLFKZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHYDOXHRILWV
SRSXODWLRQ¶VSURSHUWLHVIRUH[DPSOHODQGVDnd buildings). In 1765-66 that contribution was partially returned to 
WKHPXQLFLSDOLW\IROORZLQJWKHSUDFWLFHRIWKHGH¶0HGLFLVZKHUHDVE\-76, the Decimino (Book of 




Nevertheless, in 1775-76, the financial report requires the Municipality to be accountable for 
the use of this ³Exceptional income´, shown also as ³Exceptional expenses´ on the other side 
of the financial report. This was meant to shift both the political and economic responsibility 
for poor people, security and road maintenance over to the Municipality.  
 
The expenditures in 1775-76 included the salaries for the central and municipal officials: the 
Commissario was a decentralized official of the central government (see also Figure 3 on the 
administrative organisation of the Municipality), the Donzello and messengers of the Court 
pertained to the Florence imperial court, whereas members of Magistratura and the General 
Council (Judges), the Camarlingo, and tax auditors were considered municipal officials. The 
accountants in charge of the custody, recording and delivery of the accounting books were 
related to the municipal administration to ensure a systematic and ordered bookkeeping, 
which emphasizeG WKH0XQLFLSDOLW\¶V increased responsibility for its operations. The record 
µOrdinary payment¶ in 1775-76 identified specific expenses of the Municipality, including 
inspection of the roads, maintenance of the rivers and paying the salary of teachers, the 
surgeon, the clockmaker and the salt-dealer. These latter figures were considered as 
municipal officials. Other relevant public services were related to the post office or the 
reimbursement of the damages by wrongdoers. In contrast to the commercial activities that 
were subjected to ³custom duties´, and thereby considered as source of income, the activities 
tied to the local authorities were considered to be a part of the µwelfare services¶ of the 
Municipality which had to be covered by the Municipality with its own resources. Moreover, 
the ³Deductions on the income from auctions´ and half of the ³income (mid-earn) from 
customs duties´ (in 1765-66) had to be transferred from the Municipality back to the central 
level.  
 
In 1775-76, the central role formerly given to the Chiesto tax was substituted with a 
µRedemption tax¶ and re-classified within µExpenditure¶. The Chiesto tax was a set of taxes 
which was generally imposed on individual communities on the basis of their estimates and 
the population. From the census statistics of Repetti (1843), in 1745 the Grand Duchy had a 
population of 893,724 inhabitants, distributed in 248 communities. The community of Terra 
del Sole had 170 inhabitants and Castrocaro 808, but the Municipality of Castrocaro and 
Terra del Sole (as re-organised under Peter Leopold) counted 1,952 inhabitants. Due to the 
Seven Years war, this taxation system remained untouched until a first attempt to implement 
a real estate registry, between 1762 and 1763, which was postponed until 1765. But it is 
necessary to wait until 1774 to see the reform of the taxation and the introduction of the Book 
of Estimates (Decimino). According to the Reform, the former Chiesto tax deposited at the 
Central Cash of Florence should have been credited against the Redemption tax amount of 
each Municipality. The economic importance of the ³Redemption tax´ within the 
Municipality¶V financial report was directly tied to the new fiscal aspects implemented by 
Peter Leopold through the Reform. With respect to the Chiesto tax, the annual ³Redemption 
tax´, the amount of which was fixed after being calculated once on the basis of the rents of 
the Municipalities assets and the estimates of their land-owners, was meant to cover the 
activity of the central authorities. 
 
Article 16 of the PR of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole stipulated that the difference between 
the former Chiesto and the ³Redemption tax´ which pertained to the Municipalities and was 
stored in the Central Cash of Florence had to be given back to the Municipalities. The 
abolition of the Chiesto (article 17 of the PR of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole) and the 
introduction of the µRedemption tax¶ (article 23 of GR and article 27 of PR) stressed the 
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relevance of the Book of Estimates (Decimino) to guarantee the fairness of taxation, 
especially ³land taxation´. In 1775-76, the µRedemption tax¶ is considered an expenditure for 
the Municipality as it is entirely transferred to the central level, while in 1765-66 the Chiesto 
was partially re-distributed to the Municipality and its actual amount seemed very little[2]. 
Although the µRedemption tax¶ substituted for the sole Chiesto (and a few number of other 
taxes), but it left the remainder of the taxation, mainly indirect taxation on patrimony, 
unaffected. 
 
5. The financial LPSDFWRI3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUPRQWKH0XQLFLSDOLW\ 
The 5HIRUP¶Vfinancial impact is most obvious, as shown in Table 1, with the comparison of 
the financial reports of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole in 1765-66 and 1775-76 for items such 
as custom duties from commercial activities, tax and expenditures for the central offices, 
H[SHQVHVRIWKH0XQLFLSDOLW\LQFOXGLQJPXQLFLSDORIILFHUV¶VDODULHVWD[LQFRPHH[SHQGLWXUH
and balance of the Municipality. As one of the evaluation criteria of the Reform, the 
promotion of economic growth, the proxy of which in this study is the amount of duties on 
commercial and productive activities, a comparison of the financial reports in 1765-66 and in 
1775-76 after the Reform reveals that income from ³Custom duties over commercial 
activities´ slightly increased in 1775-76 (from 380 lire in 1765-66 to 472 lire in 1775-76). 
This could have been derived from an increase of the underlying commercial activities under 
3HWHU /HRSROG¶V UXOH DQG KHQFH DQ Lncrease in wealth as a result of the commercial 
development of the Municipality.  
 
Table 1 ± Reclassification and comparison of financial reports of Castrocaro and Terra 
del Sole 1765-66 and 1775-76. 
 
1765-66 Lire Soldi Denari 1775-76 Lire Soldi Denari 
Wages of public officials 1458 19 2 Wages of public officials 1514 1 8 
Customs duties on 
commercial activities 
380 2 8 Customs duties on 
commercial activities 
472 0 6 
Other expenses for public 
services 
31 12 10 Other expenses for public 
services 
102 6 4 
Central offices (it 
includes the 
reimbursement to the 
Municipality of the 
expenses to compile a 
local census) 
582 3 6 Central offices 122 11 4 
Taxes (see Note)  4 2 0 Taxes (see Note)  819 10 3 
Rent and properties 4567 12 0 Rent and properties 
(including interests on 
census) 
7164 9 8 
Economic privileges for 
families with 12 children 
(from central level) 
34 0 4 Economic privileges for 
families with 12 children 
(paid by the municipality) 
98 2 10 
 
                                                          
[2] The 1765-66 financial report does not contain the precise amount of the Chiesto tax for two reasons: a) there 
were not homogeneous criteria or rules for census and estimates which could differ in time and location (see 
Contini and Martelli, 2007); b) most of the Chiesto tax was re-distributed to the communities in various forms 
which were accounted for in the financial reports. Contini and Martelli (2007: 157) refer to an amount of 
taxation of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany of 955.775 scudi (or 7,168 lire, 6 soldi and 3 denari) in 1738, of which 
157.327 scudi of direct taxes (based on the estimates and the population number of each community) and 
798.448 scudi of indirect taxes (based on the consumptions). 
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Note: All figures shown have been obtained from numerous entries in the original reports. 
 
Evaluation of the Reform has incorporated consideration of ³allocative efficiency´ measured 
by a lower amount of expenses for central offices, lower taxes and lower expenses for public 
services delivery at the municipal level. Table 1 shows the amount that the Municipality of 
Castrocaro and Terra del Sole owed to the central administration in Florence ³for the 
payment of the salaries of central officers´. A significant lower amount of the municipal 
contribution to the central offices, as shown in Table 1 (from 582 lire in 1765-66 to 122 lire 
in 1775-76), indicates that the Reform might have actually reduced the involvement of the 
central offices in the local administration. This was reflected in changes in the role of 
accounting, encompassing the custody, delivery and archiving of the accounting books of the 
Municipality, which might have been subsumed in the emergence of some municipal 
officials, as recorded in 1775-76. However, the actual amount of taxation, including the 
Chiesto (in 1765-66) or the Redemption tax (in 1775-76), largely increased after the Reform, 
even if the former Chiesto tax (in the central cash of Florence) was credited against the 
amount of Redemption tax calculated for Castrocaro and Terra del Sole in 1775-76. From the 
former section, it was noted that the substitution of the variable Chiesto with the fixed 
³Redemption tax´ was meant to introduce fairness and certainty in both the taxation 
principles and the calculation of the amount upon individual Municipalities, but it did not 
seem to affect the burden of taxation on tax payers. Furthermore, given that the ³Redemption 
tax´ was not redistributed among the Municipalities, as for the Chiesto tax, the pressure of 
taxation appeared disproportionately higher after the Reform (from 4 lire in 1765-66 to 819 
lire in 1775-76).  
 
Another main result of the Reform in 1775-76 was represented by an increased amount of 
municipal expenses for public services from 31 lire to 102 lire (see Table 1), including the 
municipal post office, inspections of the municipal boundaries, religious celebrations for 
Castrocaro and Terra del Sole, and reimbursement of the damages of the wrongdoers. 
However, both these results do not support an ³allocative efficiency´ perspective. Whereas an 
increase of the public services expenses might have been beneficial for the local population, 
the disproportionate amount of taxation required to support the Municipality appears to be far 
less desirable or beneficial at the municipal level. There is also a slight increase of the 
salaries of the local authorities, from 1,458 lire in 1765-66 to 1,514 lire in 1775-76 (see Table 
1), which does not appear as significant as the decrease in the central offices salaries. This 
signifies that the Reform did not substantially change the administrative organisation at the 
municipal level but leveraged on the existing apparatuses of 1765-66, requiring them to do 
more with less. 
 
One of the aspects of the Reform which is not tied to the efficiency of allocation but to the 
rhetoric which drove the increasing focus in 1775-76 on the µcensus¶, is represented by 
revenues from land properties, buildings, bridges, and other properties. The amount shown in 
Table 1 is a net amount resulting by subtracting from the census revenues, such as customs 
duties on constructions, property fees and rents, the municipal expenses related to public 
works, including road construction, maintenance of the buttress, (see Table 1 for a complete 
account). In 1765-66 the amount of revenues from rent and property-related incomes was 
4,577 lire, less 10 lire transferred back to the central level, whereas in 1775-76 the amount is 
12,982 lire less 5,818 lire which represents, in this case, public works expenditure devolved 
to the Municipalities after the Reform. This change exposed the Municipality to a higher 
20 
 
attention to the estimates and a large increase in expenses tied to public works, which was 
completely absent in the period before the Reform. These considerations confirm a 
considerable increase in both the income (customs duties, taxes, rent and properties) and 
expenses managed by the Municipality (wages of public officials, other expenses for public 
services, economic privileges for families with 12 children) , which resulted in a slight 
decrease of the public deficit of the Municipality. Specifically, customs duties increased from 
lire 380 to lire 472; taxes rose from 4 lire to 819 lire; rent and properties increased from 4,567 
lire to 7,164 lire. Regarding the expenditures, wages of public officials increased from 1,458 
lire to 1,514 lire; other expenses for public services rose from 31 lire to 102 lire and the 
economic privileges for families with 12 children increased from 34 lire to 98 lire. 
Meanwhile, the amount paid by the Municipality to the central offices decreased from 582 
lire to 122 lire. According to the criteria for the evaluation of the financial performance of a 
decentralization reform, this slight deficit decrease should be regarded as a positive signal. 
Overall, it becomes more obvious that implementation of the Reform appeared to be 
successful in guaranteeing a certain autonomy to the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra 
del Sole, especially in terms of administrative apparatus and ability to leverage both incomes 
and expenses, leveraging mainly on properties and the ³census´. However, the real cost of the 
Reform could be read in terms of an escalation of the costs of public works.  
 
Most of the municipal expenses concerned public works and services which were re-directed 
to the Municipality instead of being performed or paid for by the central administration. As a 
consequence, it can be concluded that the Municipality found its new legitimacy in the ability 
to finance new public works, public services and poor families. However, differently from 
what was expected by the Reform rhetoric and evaluation, the amount of taxation increased 
enormously for the Municipality, with much less transferred back from the central level. As 
the attention of the Reform seemed to be more focused on the municipal reorganisation and 
the taxation (income side), it does not appear, from a financial point of view, that Peter 
Leopold regency intended to constrain the expenditure.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This study has examined the rationale and accounting impliFDWLRQV RI 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V
Reform between 1774 and 1775 at the municipal level in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany 
(Donatini, 1998; Vasina, 1981; Zaghini, 1981). By measuring the financial impact of the 
reforms on the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole using a longitudinal 
comparison of financial reports before (1765-66) and after (1775-76) the Reform, the Reform 
was shown to be motivated and justified by the priorities which were consistent with the 
transformative public sector reforms of NPM from the late 20th century. The benefits of the 
decentralization RI WKH UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG SRZHUV RI JRYHUQPHQW UHODWHG WR ³DOORFDWLYH
HIILFLHQF\´ ZHUH HYDOXDWHGE\XVLQJ WKHGULYHUV RI UHIRUP VXJJHVWHGE\ 130DQGSROLWLFDO
economy and taxation studies, drawing upon the accounting records and financial reports of 
the Municipality of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole over a period of ten years, from the 
instalment of Peter Leopold in the Grand Duchy to the actual implementation of the Reform. 
The analysis was made possible by a high level of systematization and comparability of the 
accounting records, within the timeframe chosen.  
 
Analysis of the GR and PR of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole supports the conclusion that the 
source of legitimation of the Reform was the introduction of a ³new government style´ 
(Evans, 2010; Potter, 1999) based on a rationalization of the municipal administrative system 
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DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ³VXEVLGLDU\ SULQFLSOH´ E\ GHFHQWUDOL]LQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU SURYLGLQJ WKH
services. The benefits of this new principle of government emphasized a reduction of the 
control of municipal activities by central government offices, thus greatly enhancing the 
0XQLFLSDOLW\¶V³autonomy´ in the choice of the best forms of ³accountability and control´IRU
the delegated functions. These included more direct control by the Municipality of tax 
auditors used by the Deputati and improved reports from the Deputati to Magistratura about 
their activities. Tax payers, who were property owners, would also have better access to the 
Municipal accounting records of income and expenditures.  
 
The introduction of a new taxation system was meant to be supported by an economic 
discourse which related political participation in the municipal government to the status of 
ownership. Indeed, the Borsa electoral mechanism for municipal offices relied on the 
Decimino (or Book of Estimates) of the Municipalities. As a consequence, the possibility to 
be part of the municipal political and administrative system was not linked to any ³birth 
right´ but to ownership status when the estimated rent of properties ultimately resulted in 
qualification by being a taxpayer (Maran et al., 2013). This change was fundamental to 
decentralisation and to the enactment of principles which are very similar to those advocated 
by current NPM reforms. Unlike other European monarchies (see Bisman, 2009; Gomes et 
al., 2008; Miller, 1990; Nitikin, 2001; Oestreich, 1982; Platonova, 2009; Rose, 1991; 
Sanchez Matamoros and Gutierrez Hidalgo, 2012; Sargiacomo, 2009; Yayla, 2011), these 
results confirmed the similarity RI3HWHU/HRSROG¶V5HIRUPto modern NPM reforms with its 
emphasis on the decentralisation of responsibilities to the local levels. 
 
The rationalization of the fiscal system came about through the substitution of the previous 
variable Chiesto with an annually fixed and pre-defined ³Redemption tax´ ZKLFK ZDV
regularly accounted for in the financial report 1775-76 of Castrocaro and Terra del Sole. 
Evidence indicated that differences between Chiesto DQG³5HGHPSWLRQ WD[´concerned both 
their amount and classification within the financial reports which, in turn, supported a 
VSHFLILF³SROLWLFDO´DLP)RUH[DPSOHWKHIXOODFFRXQWRIWKH³5HGHPSWLRQWD[´RXWOLQHVKRZ
Castrocaro and Terra del Sole were held accountable for the actual calculation and collection 
of the taxation which, differently from the Chiesto in 1765-66, should have been transferred 
back to the central level of government. 7KLV UHVXOW KLJKOLJKWV KRZ 3HWHU /HRSROG¶V
decentralization was more concerned with the delegation of responsibilities and expenditure 
SRWHQWLDO WR WKH ORFDO OHYHO UDWKHU WKDQ WKH WD[ OHY\SRZHU7KXV WKH³HIILFLHQF\´VKRXOGEH
read in terms of expected enhancement of tax collection at the municipal level, without 
attacking the actual fiscal pressure. This is particularly relevant also for the evaluation of 
current NPM reforms where both responsibilities and tax levy may be delegated to the local 
levels, implying a possible increase instead of a decrease of the fiscal pressure over the local 
population. 
 
The detail of the financial records demonstrated that municipal ³autonomy´ became also 
quite explicit with regard to expenditure. This confirms that the main intention of Peter 
/HRSROG¶V5HIRUPZDVrelated to the principles of taxation and matters of income rather than 
expenditure. 7KHHYDOXDWLRQRI WKH ³DOORFDWLYH HIILFLHQF\´RI WKH5HIRUP LV FRPSOLFDWHGE\
the financial result of the newly acquired ³autonomy´ for the Municipality of Castrocaro and 
Terra del Sole where income increased significantly (to approximately 14,172 lire in 1775-76 
from 5,740 lire in 1765-66) as did the expenses (to 13,151 lire in 1775-76 from 2,193 lire in 
1765-66, see Table 1), including those tied to public works, with a slight reduction of the 
deficit. In this regard, the findings at Table 1 show an increasing attention to the rent and 
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property aspect, the net amount of which grew to 7,167 lire in 1775-76 against 4,567 lire in 
1765-66 for Castrocaro and Terra del Sole. A comparison of the amounts dedicated to the 
census exercise (5,565 lire in expenditure of the Municipality in 1775-76 against 40 lire in 
1765-66 as a transfer from the central level to the Municipality for that service) also explains 
KRZWKH³RZQHUVKLSORJLF´RI WKH5HIRUPSHQHWUDWHGWKHILQDQFLDOUHSorts classification and 
focus. 
 
Following the encouragement of Platonova (2009) and Carnegie and Napier (1996, 2002), 
this study has enhanced understanding of the role of accounting in public administration. By 
highlighting the significance of Peter LeopolG¶V GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ LQ WKH HLJKWHHQWK FHQWXU\ 
through a comprehensive effort of assessment of its political and financial impacts, the study 
provides further insights on both the modern State building process and on the possible 
application of NPM understDQGLQJ RI ³SHUIRUPDQFH´. At the same time, this study has 
provided the means to identify the methodological benefits, limitations and criticalities of 
using NPM tools of decentralization evaluation. The Reform brought forward a process of 
innovation that would have come much later with the Napoleonic rule, with all the elements 
of full recognition of property as a qualification to exercise political rights, and the rise of a 
State bureaucracy that created the future bourgeoisie even if they were not made by the 
bourgeoisie. The possible unintended consequence of this project was the spiralling increase 
of both income (tax) and expenditures at the municipal level. 
 
Despite the limitations of the primary sources available, the results of this study provide the 
means to define and measure the costs of municipal autonomy. They give account not only to 
the new logic of the Reform but also to its consequences at the closest level of administration 
with respect to the administered population. Further research could seek to extend the 
analysis of the accounting impact of the Reform to the other Municipalities of the Grand 
Duchy of Tuscany. A comparison between the Hapsburg-Lorraine rule and the former Italian 
rule would emphasize the differences in the systems of values and the specific elements that 




Appendix 1 - Excerpts from GR 
Section General 
Regulation 
Main Sentences Articles that 




³>@WKHHFRQRPLFDVSHFWs have to be managed and administrated 
E\WKRVHZKRKDYHGLUHFWLQWHUHVWVRQWKHP´ 
 
7KH 0XQLFLSDOLWLHV KDYH WKH ³RSWLRQ WR JRYHUQ WKHPVHOYHV >«@
without a closed dependence from the central Chamber of 
0XQLFLSDOLWLHVLQ)ORUHQFH>«@DVWKH\>WKHPXQLFLSDO members of 
Magistratura] must have a deeper knowledge about the municipal 
needs. Leaving the Municipalities the freedom to examine the 
report of their own income and expenditures, We think that their 
]HDODQGSXEOLFVHUYLFHZLOOLQFUHDVH´ 
 
At the MuniciSDO OHYHO WKH ³QHZ 0DJLVWUDWXUD LV FRPSRVHG RI D
Gonfaloniere and some Representatives of the Municipality. Each 
Municipality will also have a General Council. All the members of 


















Focus on Borsa 
and Decimino 
Borsa is composed of the names of the owners of demesne 
(depending on the estimated value of their demesne), who are 
eligible to public offices thanks to their ownership. 
The person/s who will become member/s of public offices 
(Magistratura, Council, Camerlengo, ...).is/are extracted from the 
Borsa 
 
³'HFLPLQR is a register that contains the names of all the 
municipal owners, the description of their demesne (lands, 
buildings, ...) located in the Municipality, and the estimated value 
of the demesne, regardless of the place of residence or family 
RULJLQVRIWKRVHRZQHUV´ 
Art. 4, 5, 7, 8, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 





Art. 5, 7, 8, 28, 




Focus on the 
taxation system 
³$Q\0XQLFLSDOLW\ZLOOEHFKDUJHGZLWKDQ\NLQGRIDQQXDOWD[HV
generally called chiesto to face universal or ordinary expenditures 
of the Central level each time they emerge.  
Only when the Central level has extraordinary needs/emergencies, 
DQH[WUDRUGLQDU\WD[ZLOOEHOHYLHGDIWHUDSUHYLRXVSXEOLFDWLRQ´ 
 
³$OOIRUPVRIWD[DWLRQJHQHUDOO\FDOOHGchiesto, will be suppressed 
and each Municipality will have to pay the Cash of the Chamber 






³7KH 5HGHPSWLRQ WD[ KDV WR EH FKDUJHG RQ SHasants, 




tax is decided by each Municipality. The amount, when identified, 
has to remain the same, regardless of the subsequent Municipality 
H[SHQGLWXUHVDQGRURWKHURFFXUHQFHV´ 
 
³7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ WKH WRWDODPRXQWRI5HGHPSWLRQ WD[GXH




























charged to handicraftsmen and peasants, has to be charged to 
owners of lands or buildings, depending on the value of their 
ownership, as estimated in the Decimino ERRN«´ 
 
As a consequence of the reduction of the administrative apparatus 
of control, the connected taxation (tax of control) has to be 









4 Public service 
principle 
³,IWKHSHUVRQZKRZDVH[WUDFWHGGRHVQRWDFFHSWWKHRIILFH«KH






³>«@ DQG LQ RUGHU WR DFFRXQW IRU PXQLFLSDO SHRSOH¶V ]HDO VNLOOV






³:H UHFRPPHQG WKHP PXQLFLSDO SXEOLF RIILFHUV WKH JHQHUDO
LQWHUHVWRIWKHLURZQ0XQLFLSDOLW\´ 
 
³7R JXDUDQWHH DQG VDWLVI\ WKH JHQHUDO LQWHUHVW >«@ WZR
straightforward and skilled persons (named Deputati) can be 
HOHFWHG DPRQJ WKH HOLJLEOH SHUVRQV WR 0DJLVWUDWXUD >«@ ZLWK WKH
assignments to calculate and share out the taxes on the taxpayers 
>«@´ 
 






The Cancelliere of the Municipality will be requested to guarantee 
the same assistance for all forms of taxation, as if these taxes came 
































5 Autonomy of the 
- Municipality 
 ³>WKH 0DJLVWUDWXUD RI WKH 0XQLFLSDOLW\ KDV@ WKH IXOO DQG IUHH
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIWKH>0XQLFLSDO@LQFRPHDQGH[SHQGLWXUH«´ 
 
³>:H@ ZLOO GHFUHDVH WKH QXPEHU RI WKH 0XQLFLSDO DFFRXQWLQJ
books that has to be checked by accounting auditors in Florence 
>«@´ 
 
³>0XQLFLSDO RIILFHUV KDYH@ WR UHIHU WR WKHLU >0DJLVWUDWXUD¶V@
















6 Autonomy of the 
Municipality on 
Expenditure 
³7KH 0XQLFLSDOLW\ LV IUHH IURP DQ\ REOLJDWLRQ WR DVN IRU &HQWUDO
DSSURYDO RQ SD\PHQWV RI ERWK WKH RIILFHUV¶ ZDJHV DQG WKH
H[SHQGLWXUHVWKH\LQFXURQZKLOHDFWLQJIRUWKHSXEOLFVHUYLFH>«@




Municipal Giusdicente has the possibility to cut off the Municipal 
expenditure when he thinks that it is too burdensome or not useful 
for the 0XQLFLSDOLW\´ 
 
³$Q\H[SHQGLWXUHRIWKH0XQFLSDOLW\KDVWREHSDLG\HDUO\WKURXJK















7 Autonomy of the 
Municipality on  
income 
³>7KH 0XQLFLSDOLW\ LV IUHH@ WR LPSURYH LWV LQFRPH WKURXJK WKH
LQFUHDVHRIHVWDWHDQGRUUHQWV´ 
 
³>7KH 0XQFLSDOLW\@ FDQQRW ELQG QHLWKHU VHOO LWV HVWDWH GLUHFWO\ ,W
cannot compromise the amount of rents, receivables or other 



















³$QG :H ZDQW WKDW DOO WKH FRQWUROV >IURP WKH &HQWUDO DXGLWRUV@
mentioned above will be run yearly in order to verify both the 






³7KHGHILQLWLRQDQGVKDULQJRXWRI WKH WD[DWLRQ LVGHILQHGE\ WZR
Deputati, however the Magistratura will elect two other persons as 
WD[DXGLWRUV>«@WKH\KDYHWRFRQWUROWKH'HSXWDWL¶VGHFLVLRQVDQG
verify that no one will pay more or less taxes by mishap or 
PLVWDNH>@´ 
 
³$Q\ RZQHU RU WD[ SD\HU LV DOZD\V DOORZHG WR VHH WKH ERRNV of 
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